Abstract
Introduction
Many security policies involve confidentiality requirements. Confidentiality properties of programs, formalized in terms of noninterference [9] , can be checked using static information flow analysis [25, 24] . But this has seen little use in practice. As discussed in the recent survey by Sabelfeld and Myers [21] , extant static analyses are somewhat restrictive and a satisfactory treatment of declassification remains elusive. It is access control that is widely used.
One approach to checking confidentiality of code using access control is to somehow designate those atomic steps by which information can flow, and prove that the steps are only taken when the appropriate access control events have occurred. This approach has obvious merit but leaves open the question of making a rigorous connection with strong £ Supported by NSF grants CCR-0209205 and NSF Career award CCR-
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information flow policies like "the user's private key is not leaked to the seller". What is the connection between authorization of a data-access event and the subsequent dissemination of information contained therein?
In fact, previous work on static analysis of information flow in programs (e.g., [7, 25, 24, 12, 17] ) is based on control of data access, as we discuss further in Section 8. But the connections are made using constraints that allow entirely static checking of access and the access mechanisms considered are akin to ordinary scoping mechanisms like private fields, name-equivalence of types, and pointer confinement [4] . Similar connections have been made in more abstract models [20, 13] .
In this paper we are concerned with programs that use access control dynamically in the sense that permissions determine runtime behavior. Permissions are not simply identified with data items and principals are not identified with confidentiality levels. We show how dynamic access control can allow flexible program interfaces where a data channel can be used for more than one purpose, while ensuring confidentiality.
We consider the access control mechanism of Java [10] , which aims to protect trusted system code (e.g., a browser) from untrusted mobile code. The principals that are granted permissions in an access policy are programs rather than, say, processes or users as in operating system security.
We consider programs that use access control to enforce an information-flow policy expressed by labelling of input and output channels with levels in a lattice [5, 6] . We give a static analysis in the style of security typing [25, 24] but also tracking the permissions manipulated by the access control constructs. We prove a form of noninterference for typable programs. As in previous work, our analysis validates code with respect to a given policy. Here, policy designates both trust (authorization of different permissions for different programs) and confidentiality levels.
Our rules account for calls into the trusted computing base that might return high security information, but which use access checks to ensure that only low security informa-tion is returned unless the caller has been given access.
We use a simple form of noninterference, suited to observation only of the initial and final states of terminating computations of sequential programs. Mantel and Sabelfeld [14] study connections between program-centric formulations and the formulation of noninterference in terms of abstract event systems [9] .
In Section 2 we give a streamlined description of the relevant features of the Java access control mechanism, which is supported by the Java Virtual Machine (a very similar mechanism is supported by the Common Language Runtime [11] which is the typical target for compilation of C ). We also review the use of labelled types to specify confidentiality in imperative [25] and object-oriented [4, 16] programs.
Section 3 gives an example to illustrate the main idea of the paper: giving several information-flow types to a method, dependent on the permissions that may be enabled by callers. We give two types to a method providing a system service. One type says that it returns only low information, if called by a program for which designated permissions are not authorized. The other type applies to programs that are granted the permissions and says that for them the result is high.
Section 4 formalizes the programming language, giving typing rules and a compositional semantics which facilitates proof by structural induction on program syntax. At the cost of notation more complex than the minimum necessary to illustrate our main idea, we consider a sequential objectoriented language with all the features treated in [4] (pointers and mutable state, private fields and class-based visibility, dynamic binding and inheritance, recursive classes, casts and type tests, and recursive methods). The reason for this choice is to show that the idea scales to a realistic language and to lay a broader foundation for future work (e.g., permissions and protection domains as first-class objects as in Java).
The main contributions of the paper are the ideas in Section 3 and their technical development in conjunction with inheritance and dynamic binding. For pointers and confinement the treatment in [4] carries over without difficulty.
Section 5 formalizes a static analysis using permissiondependent method types in syntax-directed rules which admit the examples of Section 3. Section 6 proves basic results about the analysis, which are used in Section 7 to prove the main result: the static analysis ensures noninterference.
Access control and information flow
Access control by stack inspection. In the Java access control mechanism [10] , each class has a set ÙØ of permissions associated with it; this comprises a local access control policy. A typical policy grants few permissions to code from remote sites and many to code residing on the local disk. The most interesting policies concern trusted remote sites: Code which has been cryptographically authenticated as originating at a trusted site may be granted particular permissions.
As an example of the use of permissions, a user program might have the permission Ô for changing passwords but not the permission Û for directly writing the password file. There is an operation checkPermission for checking whether a permission is authorized for the classes of all code with frames (activation records) on the current call stack. If this fails to be the case, a catchable exception is thrown. This mechanism has no intrinsic connection with particular data objects or events; it is up to the programmer to ensure that writes to the password file are guarded by checks of permission Û.
Following previous work [8] , we refrain from modeling exceptions and instead consider a construct, test Ô then Ë ½ else Ë ¾ , which performs the check, executing Ë ½ if the check succeeds and Ë ¾ if it fails. A method body that simply performs a check can be written test Ô then skip else abort. To model the case where an exception is thrown and caught, the else part can return some value that indicates to the caller that a check has failed.
In fact, what is checked is slightly more subtle than authorization for all code on the stack. In keeping with the principle of least privilege, permissions must be explicitly enabled by an operation doPrivileged. This is implemented using a callback object with the effect of lexical scoping. We model it by a construct, enable Ô in Ë, the effect of which is to mark Ô as enabled in the current frame. The relevant information in a frame is a pair É where is the class providing the code for the frame and É ¾ È´È ÖÑ ×× ÓÒ×µ is a set of permissions. The effect of enable Ô in Ë is to add Ô to É for the duration of Ë. The precise meaning of test Ô is as follows: check whether Ô is marked in some frame for which Ô is authorized, and in addition Ô is authorized for all subsequent frames including the current one. This allows a method to, in effect, temporarily grant a permission to methods in the call chain to it. It cannot, however, grant permissions to code that it invokes. System code can invoke plug-ins without risk of giving them unintended permissions and it can also perform sensitive operations on behalf of untrusted callers. The class in the pair É is that which declares the method. Due to inheritance, it may be a proper superclass (and have different permissions) than the class of the target object. As described above, stack inspection is lazy in that authorization checks are only performed when needed. For theoretical analysis, it is convenient to use the equivalent eager semantics [10, 19, 8] Checking information flow using security types. The idea developed by Volpano et al. [25] is to label not only inputs and outputs but also variables and parameters by security types, for example replacing a variable declaration Ü Ì by Ü Ì µ where is the security level. As usual, we consider the representative two-element lattice Ä À of levels. Syntax-directed typing rules specify conditions that ensure secure flow. Overt flows, like an assignment of an À-variable to an Ä-variable, are disallowed by the typing rules for assignment, argument passing, etc. To preclude covert flow via control flow, commands are given types ÓÑ with the meaning that all assigned variables have at least level . For a conditional, if then Ë ½ else Ë ¾ , with high, both Ë ½ and Ë ¾ are required to have type ÓÑ À.
In an object-oriented language, covert flow also happens via dynamically dispatched method call. Moreover, there is the possibility of observing differing behavior of the allocator if objects allocated conditionally are accessible. Such issues are treated in [16, 4] . In [4] , commands are given types´ ÓÑ ½ ¾ µ where ½ is a lower bound on the level of assigned variables and ¾ is a lower bound on the heap effect (field assignements and newly allocated objects). Annotated arrow types are used for modular checking in the case of methods (or procedures or functions [1] ): the typé Ì ½ µ ¾ ´Í ¿ µ designates input level ½ , heap effect ¾ , and result level ¿ . A method body is checked with respect to its type, which is used as an assumption for checking method calls.
An access control mechanism may itself be a channel for covert flows. For the mechanism in this paper, the set of currently enabled permissions can be seen as an implicit variable which can be tested. But values of this implicit variable are manipulated in a very restricted way that reflects only control flow information. Our noninterference result confirms that straightforward security typing rules suffice to control the flows introduced by test and enable. What is more interesting is the use of test to achieve information flow goals.
Using access control for confidentiality
Consider a system composed of components, some of which are from untrusted sources. Class Kern is a trusted system class and Vend1 is from a less trusted source. To a first approximation, a confidentiality goal would be that information confidential to Kern is not leaked to Vend1 . This policy could be expressed by labelling certain inputs to Kern as level À and the others as Ä. In practice, the levels in the security lattice might correspond to code sources and thus be correlated with permissions. But, like [17] and unlike [12] , we do not want to presuppose a connection between information flow policy and the access control mechanism. Not all information manipulated by Kern is confidential.
For these examples we consider the set È ÖÑ ×× ÓÒ× ×Ý× ×Ø Ø ÓØ Ö . The intention is that ×Ý× guards a method getHinfo of Kern that returns À information, and ×Ø Ø guards a method getStatus that can be used by trusted callers manipulating À information and also untrusted ones manipulating Ä. Access policy ÙØ is as follows: Class Vend1 has access to an instance of Kern. It has a method status returning the catenation of applicationspecific data v with the status from the kernel. This exemplifies the use of getStatus by untrusted callers.
Execution of method status proceeds as follows: To evaluate the catenation, invoke k.getStatus() which tests ×Ø Ø. The test fails, as ×Ø Ø has not been enabled, so getStatus returns k.Linfo. This is compatible with the policy that status has Ä output.
For an information flow analysis to allow Vend1.status, it is necessary to take into account the test in getStatus and also the access policy for Vend1. Otherwise, a sound analysis of getStatus would say that it can return À which violates the flow policy for Vend1.status.
Vend1 could try to gain access to Hinfo as follows: As indicated by "??" in class Kern, the question is how to type method getStatus so we can formulate a modular check that admits the valid examples while rejecting code (or access policy) that violates the information flow policy. In particular, all of the example code above should be allowed.
Volpano and Smith, among others, consider procedure typings that are polymorphic in levels [24] (to handle cases where level-« inputs yields level-« outputs). Such systems cannot handle our examples, because the result level for getStatus depends not on explicit input parameters but on enabled permissions.
The justification of the examples hinges on reasoning about the behavior of the test in getStatus. This There is an evident notion of subtyping which we do not consider in this paper. For practical application, one would specify the security of a method using a set of types that are minimal with respect to subtyping.
To deal with dynamic binding in a modular way, we require that an overriding declaration must be checked with the same set of typings as the method it overrides. The permissions involved need not be authorized for the class in which the declaration occurs. A subclass that overrides a method may have different permissions than its superclass. This is discussed further in Section 5, where the security typing rules are defined using judgements ¡ È Ë that characterize the behavior of Ë under the assumption that permissions È are not initially enabled. 
Language
Our results are for a sequential class-based language similar to the one in the predecessor paper [4] with the addition of access control. This section presents the language without security annotations; it is this language for which the semantics is defined. As compared with [4] , some improvements have been made to the language and semantics following [2] to which we refer for more extensive explanations.
We assume given a finite set of È ÖÑ ×× ÓÒ× as well as function ÙØ Ð ××AE Ñ × È´È ÖÑ ×× ÓÒ×µ. 
Syntax
The grammar is given by Table 1 . It is based on given sets of class names (with typical element ), field names ( ), method names (Ñ), and variable/parameter names Ü (including distinguished names "self" and "result" for the target object and return value). Identifiers like Ì with bars on top indicate finite lists, e.g., Ì stands for a list of field names with corresponding types Ì . We let È range over sets of permissions, without formalizing syntax for sets. We also assume there is a class Object with no fields or methods.
A complete program is given as a class 
Semantics
The state of a method in execution is comprised of a heap , which is a finite partial function from locations to object states, and a store , which assigns locations and primitive values to local variables and parameters. Every store of interest includes the distinguished variable self which points to the target object. A command denotes a function from initial state to either a final state or the error value .
For locations, we assume that a countable set Ä Ó is given, along with a distinguished entity Ò Ð not in Ä Ó . We treat object states as mappings from field names to values. To track the object's class we assume given a function ÐÓ ØÝÔ Ä Ó Ð ××AE Ñ × such that for each there are infinitely many locations with ÐÓ ØÝÔ Methods are associated with classes, in a method environment, rather than with instances. For this reason the semantic domains, given in Table 3 , are relatively simple; there are no recursive domain equations to be solved. In addition to domains like Ì and that correspond directly to syntactic notations, we use the following: À Ô is the set of heaps, ×Ø Ø is the set of states of objects of class , Ô Ö Ñ × is sets of permissions authorized for , Å ÒÚ is the set of method environments, Ü Ì Ì is the set of meanings for methods of class with result Ì and parameters Ü Ì. In a language like Java with garbage collection and without pointer arithmetic, dangling locations (those not in the domain of the heap) never occur in program states or as expression values. Capturing this in the semantics is the purpose of the special cartesian products À Ô ª and À Ô ª Ì.
The semantics is defined for an arbitrary allocator, but the noninterference theorem depends on parametricity. Table 4 gives the definition.
The meaning of a command
that takes a method environment (see below), a staté µ, and the enabled permissions É ¾ Ô Ö Ñ × selfµ ; it returns a state or which indicates divergence or error or access control violation. See Table 5 .
To streamline the treatment of in the semantic definitions, we use a metalanguage construct, let ½ in ¾ , with the following meaning: If the value of ½ is then that is the value of the entire let expression; otherwise, its value is the value of ¾ with bound to the value of ½ .
Function update is written, e.g., where Ì is the return type and self Ü Ì is the parameter store, where Ü pars´Ñ µ. The result from a method, if not , is a pair´ µ with in Ì such that, if is a location then is in the domain of the result heap . The semantics of a class table Ìis the method environment, written Ì , given as the least upper bound of the ascending chain ¾ AE Å ÒÚ defined as follows.
To be very precise for an inherited method, if mtype´Ñ µ Ì Ì then ·½ Ñ should apply to stores for Ü Ì self whereas ·½ Ñ applies to stores for Ü Ì self . But the latter contains the former, as implies (see [2] ). This does not obtrude in the sequel.
The interesting aspect of inheritance is that the permissions ÙØ are not required to have any relation to the permissions ÙØ . Recall from Section 2 that access control is defined in terms of the code on the stack, not the classes of objects for which the code is executing. Leaving aside dynamic binding, the semantics of method invocation could be defined by intersecting the current permissions with those authorized for the called method. To interpret dynamic binding, our semantics branches on the type of the target object, and the method environment provides a meaning for every method. In the case of an inherited method, the permissions "authorized for the called method" should be those of its defining class, not the class into which it is inherited. So we consider that a method meaning is defined for all permission sets. Intersection with the authorized permissions is done not in the semantics of method call but in the semantics of method declarations. This is why Ü Ì Ì is defined using È´È ÖÑ ×× ÓÒ× µ rather than Ô ÖÑ× .
For a method declaration Å Ì Ñ´Ì Üµ Ë in class 
Security typing
In this section we annotate the syntax of Section 4 with security labels. Where a type Ì could occur, we use pairś Ì µ where is a security level, Ä or À. The grammar is revised as follows.
Note that there is no change for cast and test. As discussed in Section 8, labels for local variables can be inferred. In [4] , the annotation of a method appears as Ñ´ Üµ Ë , with designating the heap effect and the level of the result. By analogy with the auxiliary function mtype which gives the declared type of a method, function smtype is used in [4] to give declared annotation as discussed in Section 2.
In this paper we allow multiple typings of a method, each [16] ). Classes labelled À are also subject to a confinement condition that separates all values of the type from Ä fields and variables. This can be seen as a form of access control, as will be explored in future work. Here the main benefit is that we avoid more complicated tracking of information flow via allocation. Tables 6 and 7 give typing rules for annotated programs. We write ¡ for typing environments that assign security types. A judgement ¡ È Ë ´ ÓÑ ½ ¾ µ says that Ë is safe and assigns only to variables (locals and parameters) of level ½ and to object fields of level ¾ (see Lemma 6.4) provided that no permissions in set È are enabled initially.
We use the symbol Ý to erase annotations:´Ì µ Ý Ì , and this extends to erasure for typing environments, commands, and method declarations in an obvious way. We write " " for set subtraction. Table 5 . Semantics of commands, for given policy ÙØ and allocator Ö × . Table 6 . Security typing rules for expressions.
For commands, it suffices to consider judgements where È ÙØ ´¡ Ý selfµ; only such È is relevant to the behavior of a command declared in class ¡ Ý self, as can be seen in the rule for method declaration below.
The rule for class declarations is as follows. 
Å
The condition on overriding prevents bad flows in the case where code is checked where self is Ä but inherited in an object of À class [4] . Here is the rule for method declaration.
For each´ È ¿ µ ¾ smtypes´Ñ µ we have
The hypothesis checks the method body against all typings in smtypes, restricting the permissions to those that can possibly be enabled for this class. There is no constraint on ¾ because it tracks assignments to local variables. The rules in Table 6 and 7 use versions of the auxiliary functions that take security levels into account. Let Table 7 . Security typing rules for commands, for given ÙØ .
Corresponding to dfields, fields and ØÝÔ , we define sdfields, sfields and ×ØÝÔ which differ only in that they give security types, e.g., sdfields ½ . We also need a function level that gives the level associated with the class itself: for the declaration above, level which is . In particular, this precludes a call to getHinfo. For lack of space we do not give a thorough discussion of overriding. Moreover, we omit super-calls, although they pose no difficulty.
Properties of security typing. For any judgement
¡ È Ë ´ ÓÑ ½ ¾ µ derivable using the rules in Tables 6 and 7, the erased judgement ¡ Ý Ë Ý is derivable using the rules of Table 2 . Conversely, any program typable using the rules of Table 2 can be annotated everywhere by Ä and typed by the rules in Tables 6 and 7 , and the rule may involve several types and security labels. In writing a given proof case, we found it convenient to write down both the rule and the semantics for reference. It is impractical to include such redundancy in the paper, however. Instead, when it comes to proving something about a particular construct we make free use of identifiers in the typing rule (in Table 6 or 7), for types and labels, and identifiers in the semantic definition for semantic values (in Table 4 or 5). Note that the semantic definition may use different identifiers for types, as the semantics is based on the typing rules in Table 2 rather than the security rules in Tables 6 and 7 . We streamline the proofs by ignoring outcomes and omitting many cases.
Confinement
This section shows that if a program is accepted by the security typing rules of Section 5 then it maintains the invariant that Ä fields and variables never hold À locations. Moreover, commands with À effect do not assign to Ä-fields or Ä-variables. These results are similar to those in [4] , especially for the imperative control constructs.
The formalization uses the indistinguishability relation also used in the main results of Section 7. In formalizing the absence of Ä-variables that refer to À -objects, we take advantage of the fact that Ò Ð ¾ Ä Ó and ¾ Ä Ó . We use the short name "Ó " for Ä-confinement. If Ó ¡ , and Ó then ¾ Ä Ó µ ¾ ÄÄÓ . 
Definition 3 (Ä-confinement (Ó ))

Lemma 6.2 (Ä-confinement of commands)
Let ¡ È Ë ´ ÓÑ ½ ¾ µ. If Ó , Ó , Ó ¡ , É ÙØ ´¡ Ý selfµ, É È ,
¾
The proof is by induction on , using Lemmas 6.1 and 6.2, and then fixpoint induction for Ì Ý . It follows the pattern of the proof of Theorem 7.3 and is given in the full paper.
Next we formalize the indistinguishability relation .
Object states are indistinguishable by Ä if their Ä-fields are equal, and stores are indistinguishable if their Ä-variables are equal. In the case of heaps and object states, the relevant levels are determined by the field declarations in the class table. By contrast, the levels for stores are determined by parameter and local variable declarations, hence the dependence is explicit in the notation ¡ . It is straightforward to show that each of these is an equivalence relation.
Definition 4 (Indistinguishable by Ä)
If a command is typable as´ ÓÑ À µ it does not assign to Ä-variables, and if it is typable as´ ÓÑ ¾ À µ it does not assign to Ä-fields of objects. Note that the last step goes through because the safety property (Definition 6) quantifies over all É disjoint from È , without regard to the permissions of and . Note also that we are using a secondary induction on inheritance chains, so we may use the safety property for ·½ Ñto prove it for ·½ Ñ . Moreover, since Ñ is inherited from the rule requires level level so we are done.
¾
Discussion
We have given a static analysis for secure information flow that accounts for calls to the trusted computing base that can be made by both trusted and untrusted callers. Our analysis allows correct use of access control to ensure that confidential information is returned only if the caller has been given access. This improves on previous static analyses, including the predecessor paper [4] , where a system call is given a fixed security level.
Our analysis is justified by a noninterference result. This shows that even strong noninterference conditions which disallow declassification may be useful and admit practical static checking, once access control is taken into account. We only take a step in this direction, demonstrating the idea in the context of a non-trivial language but using a language-centric access control mechanism devised primarily for protecting trusted programs from untrusted mobile code.
For practical deployment of programs using stack inspection for access control, interface specifications need to express expected or recommended policies. Our method typings suggest a way to do so.
Stoughton [23] compares access control and information flow in a simple imperative language with semaphores. No formal results are proven, nor is there a static analysis for information flow. Rushby [20] proves (and mechanically checks) results on noninterference for an access control mechanism that amounts to assigning levels to variables.
